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Abstract
VCG is a classical combinatorial auction that maximizes social welfare. How-
ever, while the standard single-item Vickrey auction is false-name-proof, a major
failure of multi-item VCG is its vulnerability to false-name attacks. This occurs
already in the natural bare minimum model in which there are two identical items
and bidders are single-minded. Previous solutions to this challenge focused on de-
veloping alternative mechanisms that compromise social welfare. We re-visit the
VCG auction vulnerability and consider the bidder behavior in Bayesian settings.
In service of that we introduce a novel notion, termed the granularity threshold,
that characterizes VCG Bayesian resilience to false-name attacks as a function of
the bidder type distribution. Using this notion we show a large class of cases in
which VCG indeed obtains Bayesian resilience for the two-item single-minded
setting.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the scale of web auctions has grown significantly — whether for ads,
flight tickets or cloud computing resources — among many other commodities. Con-
trary to the settings that apply to government leases or items sold in an auction house,
in such web auctions it is much easier to forge false identities and submit multiple bids
under false names. This expands the action space of an auction participant and may
∗A preliminary and partial version of this paper is to appear in Gafni, Y., Lavi, R. and Tennenholtz M.
2020. VCG Under Sybil (False-name) Attacks - a Bayesian Analysis. In Proceedings of the 34th National
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turn mechanisms that proved formally truthful assuming only a single bid to not be
strategy-proof. Such is the case of the most classic combinatorial auction mechanism,
VCG. VCG is truthful and efficient assuming each bidder submits one bid under her
name [9]. However, assuming false-name attacks (a.k.a. sybil attacks) are possible, that
is no longer the case, as demonstrated in [13]. The main effort to address this rising
issue was done by Yokoo et al. They suggested various mechanisms that are false name
attack proof [12, 11]. The main disadvantage of these mechanisms is that they in a way
incorporate the false-name attacks to be built into the mechanism, and this significantly
reduces their efficiency. In [5] the main result shows that under reasonable conditions
the worst case efficiency of any false-name proof combinatorial auction with m items
is as bad as 2
m+1 .
As for VCG, in [1] the authors show that under some assumptions on the bidders’
valuations, and in a setting with complete information, if a pure Nash equilibrium exists
when false-name bids are considered, VCG still has a reasonable welfare guarantee.
Naturally, Nash equilibrium might not exist. Nevertheless, the above may hint that
VCG may actually be a good false-name proof mechanism in situations in which a
pure equilibrium exists.
Notice that when the behavior of the other bidders is uncertain, in some scenarios
a false-name attack may benefit the attacker, while on others the attack can harm her.
So while truthfulness is certainly no longer a dominant strategy, it is worth asking
under what circumstances it might be a truthful Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. That
is, when the auction participants only have partial probabilistic information regarding
other bidders’ valuations, when is it the best strategy for a bidder to bid truthfully
only her valuation (in a single bid), assuming all others are truthful as well? Notice
that social welfare is optimized if such an equilibrium exists. For a seller that wishes to
maximize social welfare, under the conditions in which a truthful Bayesian equilibrium
exists, VCG is the best choice of an auction mechanism.
In this work, we introduce — for the first time, to the best of our knowledge — a
Bayesian equilibrium analysis of VCG under false-name bids. In service of that we use
a bare-minimum model: an auction of two identical items, and single-minded bidders.
Namely, each bidder is interested in a single item or in the pair of items. The Bayesian
setting is given by a per-item valuation distribution, and a probability q for a bidder to
have a single-item demand. Notice that for q = 1 we get the standard Vickrey auction
which is false-name proof. Hence, our model captures the minimal step forward from
the standard Vickrey auction setting to the general multi-item case. As we will see,
the analysis of such a model already brings out intricate techniques and conclusions,
which are essential to address the problem.
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To obtain our results, we present a criterion we name “Granularity threshold” to
measure the effect of the granularity of bidders’ demands on the mechanism’s Bayesian
truthfulness. In the framework of our model, this measure is associated with the value
of q. The lower the granularity threshold is, then even with a lower q value the mecha-
nism remains truthful. We show results that prove that in our model, the more “granu-
lar” bidders’ demands are, the more VCG is Bayesian resilient to false-name attacks.
Our main results state that for two bidders (n = 2) and two items (m = 2) there is
a truthful Bayesian equilibrium whenever the probability q of a bidder to demand one
item rather than two is at least 23 , with any valuation distribution (Section 3). We then
show that for any larger number of bidders (n > 2), such a global granularity threshold
can no longer be derived and valuation distributions do matter (Section 4). Given the
above, we consider general beta distributions over per-item valuations. This family in-
cludes many natural distributions, and is used widely in statistics and economic theory
[4, 8]. With parametersα = β = 1, it is the uniform distribution, and with large α = β
parameter values, it resembles a Normal distribution. Interestingly, it admits useful
connections to computer algebra techniques, which allows us to provably present good
granularity thresholds, i.e. low q values, in tested cases (Section 5). Lastly, we focus
on an important attack form we call the split attack. In that attack a bidder who has a
2-item demand with valuation θ submits two 1-item demand bids with value θ. Inter-
estingly, we observe that in many cases this is the best false-name attack in the sense
that it determines the granularity threshold (Section 6).
2 Our Model and the Bayesian Resilience Criterion
We study a multi-item auction with two identical items and n single-minded bidders.
The type of a bidder i is denoted by θˆi = (gi, θi) where gi ∈ {1, 2} is the number
of items desired by the bidder, and θi is the per-item value of the bidder. We assume
w.l.o.g. that the per-item values are normalized to be in [0, 1]. The utility of a bidder is
quasi-linear, i.e. if the bidder receives j items and pays a price pi, her utility is
−pi j < gigi · θi − pi otherwise.
In this paper, we focus on the analysis of the VCG mechanism in a setting where
each bidder may submit multiple single-minded bids in an anonymous fashion so that
VCG treats each bid as if it comes from a separate bidder. Formally, VCG is the
mechanism that given bids B = (θˆ1, ..., θˆN ) (where N ≥ n) allocates the items to
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maximize the social welfare:
SW (B) = maxI⊆{1,...,N}s.t.
∑
i∈I
gi≤2
∑
i∈I
gi · θi.
LetW (B) be an index set I of bidders that attains the maximal social welfare, and
let L(B) be its complement. Every bid b makes the following payment:
SW (B \ θˆb)− (SW (B)− gb · θb) b ∈W (B)0 b ∈ L(B).
Every real bidder i ∈ {1, ..., n} receives her value from the union of items won by
her submitted bids, and pays the respective sum of prices.
Throughout our analysis, given the symmetric situation, we fix one bidder, bidder
n, and analyze her utility. This is done when she declares her true type and when she
submits multiple false-name bids, assuming all other bidders reveal their true types. We
term the case where the bidder submits false-name bids – an “attack”. In our analysis,
we refer to the other bidders as the “adversary” bidders. We introduce the notation
n˜ = n− 1, the number of adversary bidders. We call the vector of adversary true types
and the corresponding truthful bids “adversary setup”.
We refer to bidder i with gi = 1 as a “1-type”, and denote her value by vi. Sim-
ilarly, we refer to a bidder i with gi = 2 as a “2-type”, and denote her value wi. We
assume two separate indices, for 1-types and for 2-types. Formally, let k = |{1 ≤
i ≤ t, gi = 1}|, the number of 1-type bids. The 1-type by v1, ..., vk and the 2-type
values are denoted by w1, ..., wt−k. Notice that the VCG mechanism implies that for
any adversary setup, a bidder’s utility is uniquely determined by
v˜1 = max{vi}1≤i≤k,
v˜2 = second−max{vi}1≤i≤k,
w˜1 = max{wi}1≤i≤t−k,
with max ∅ = 0. We therefore write for bidder n bidding (θˆ′1, ..., θˆ
′
m) and adversary
setup θˆ1, . . . , θˆn˜,
u
θˆ′
1
,...,θˆ′m
(θˆ1, . . . , θˆn˜) = u˜θˆ′
1
,...,θˆ′m
(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2)
. Also notice that if biddern n submits more than one 2-type bid, all but the top one
never enters the winning set. The same holds for all but the top two 1-type bids sub-
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mitted. Since in VCG adding more losing bids can only increase the price paid, we
conclude that a bidder that wishes to maximize utility never submits more than one
2-type bid and two 1-type bids. In fact, we prove a stronger claim:
Lemma 1. Under VCG, in our setting, for any attack of bidder n, S = θˆ1, ..., θˆm, one
of the two must be true:
• There exists an attack (1, x), (1, y) such that for any adversary setup, n’s utility
from (1, x), (1, y) is not lower than her utility from S, or,
• For any adversary setup, n’s utility from the truthful bid is not lower than her
utility from S.
Proof. We already observed that a bidder prefers to bid w˜1, v˜1, v˜2, some of which may
be zero bids or equivalently omitted over bidding S. Now, if 2w˜1 ≤ v˜1+ v˜2, regardless
of the adversary bids, (2, w˜1) is never in the winning set and thus could only increase
the price for bidder n. This constitutes the first case. Otherwise, for any adversary bids
either the higher 1-type bid enters the winning set, the 2-type bid enters it or no bids
enter it, i.e., at most one of the bids w˜1, v˜1, v˜2 win. In this case, it would have been
better to bid truthfully by VCG truthfulness for single bids [9].
We subsequently regard a false-name bid attack as a bid vector (1, x), (1, y), w.l.o.g.
assuming x ≥ y. Since the utility function u depends on the bidder’s true type and her
bids, we introduce the conditional utility notation
u˜
θˆ,truth
(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2), u˜θˆ,attack(x,y)(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2)
.
Examples
We adjust an example from [13]. Assume the following two bidders’ true types:
Bid 1 - (2, 0.5), Bid 2 - (2, 0.4)
When bidder 1 bids truthfully, she wins the two items and pays 0.8. Consider what
happens if Bidder 1 splits her bid:
Bid 1 - (1, 0.5), Bid 1* - (1, 0.5), Bid 2 - (2, 0.4)
Bidder 1 still wins both items, but with a lower payment of 0.6.
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The example is highly dependent on whether Bidder 1 knows her adversary bids.
We can now see an example where the same false-name attack causes a significant loss
to the attacker (double than her previous gain). Consider the same behavior for bidder
1 as in example 1, but with a different adversary:
Bid 1 - (2, 0.5), Bid 2 - (1, 0.4)
In this case bidder 1 wins the two items and pays 0.4. If bidder 1 splits her bid the
same way as before —
Bid 1 - (1, 0.5), Bid 1* - (1, 0.5), Bid 2 - (1, 0.4)
Bidder 1 still wins both items, but now her payment is 0.8.
The above hints at the potential benefit of a Bayesian approach: one might not
submit false-name bids as her potential losses might be higher than her potential gains.
A Bayesian approach
We assume each bidder knows her own type and a distribution over the i.i.d. parame-
terized n˜ adversary true types. We assume that the distribution of true types is given by
0 ≤ q, (1− q) ≤ 1 which is the probability of a bidder i to have gi = 1, 2 respectively,
and by a per-item valuation distribution θi ∼ F which is independent of the bidder’s
gi.
A bidder’s expected utility given her true type θˆ, her bids vector S and q, F is:
Eq,F,n
θˆ,S
[u] =
n˜∑
k=0
(
n˜
k
)
qk(1− q)n˜−kEk,F,n
θˆ,S
[u],
where
Ek,F,n
θˆ,S
[u] =
∫ 1
v1=0
f(v1)...
∫ 1
vk=0
f(vk)∫ 1
w1=0
f(w1)...
∫ 1
wn˜−k=0
f(wn˜−k)u(v1, ..., wn˜−k).
Notice that since Lemma 1 holds for any adversary bids, it immediately extends to
expected utilities as well.
Definition 2.1. For a set of parameters q, F, n, we say that truthfulness is a Bayesian
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Nash Equilibrium (BNE) if for any bidder’s type θˆ, ∀0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 1, θˆ ∈ {1, 2}×[0, 1],
Eq,F,n
θˆ,truth
[u] ≥ Eq,F,n
θˆ,attack(x,y)
[u].
We say that an attack is “beneficial” for a given adversary setup if there exists a true
type such that the attack increases a bidder’s utility over her truthful bid. If we do not
specify a concrete adversary setup, an attack is “beneficial” if it increases the bidder’s
expected utility.
The following technical lemma holds:
Lemma 2. To prove that a truthful BNE exists under some settings, it suffices to analyze
1-type attackers that have θ = 1 ≥ x, y, and 2-type attackers that have x = 1 ≥ θ, y.
Proof of the lemma is given in Appendix A.
A Criterion for Bayesian Resilience
We already noted that for q = 1, under any per-item valuation distribution F , and
number of bidders n, we expect a truthful BNE, as it is basically equivalent to the
single-item case where VCG is truthful in dominant strategies. The following technical
lemma holds:
Lemma 3. When all adversaries are 1-type an attack is never beneficial. Thus, q = 1
always induces a truthful BNE.
Proof of the lemma is given in Appendix B.
Our main question is what is the minimal q value that guarantees Bayesian re-
silience, i.e. that truth-telling is in equilibrium.
Definition 2.2. Define q∗n,g,θ,x,y,F ∈ [0, 1], the “granularity threshold”, as the minimal
q such that no true type (g, θ) bidder prefers to attack with (1, x), (1, y) given that her
adversaries’ types are chosen with q′ > q∗n,g,x,y,F and valuation distribution F. If any
of the parameters are omitted, we assume the supremum of all different q∗ values with
different instantiations of the parameters. We call
q∗n = supg∈{1,2},0≤y≤x≤1,Fq
∗
n,g,x,y,F
the “global granularity threshold” for n.
The fact that VCG is truthful when there is only a single item, which is equivalent
to q = 1, gives us the intuition that if we have a high enough q, then Bayesian resilience
would be obtained. As q∗ is lower, the distribution is more resilient to Sybil attacks.
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3 A Full Characterization of the Global Granularity
Threshold for n = 2
Theorem 3.1. q∗n=2 =
2
3 .
The remainder of this section proves this theorem.
Lemma 4. q∗n=2,g=1 =
1
2 .
Proof. By Lemma 2 we assume y, x ≤ θ = 1. For n = 2 we have n˜ = 1 and so we
have one adversary, either of type 1 or 2. We separate the utility function u to u1, u2,
based on the adversary type. We then have
u2(1,1),attack(x,y)(w1) =

1 0 ≤ w1 ≤
y
2
1− 2w1 + y
y
2 < w1 ≤
x
2
1− 4w1 + y + x
x
2 < w1 ≤
x+y
2
0 otherwise,
u1(1,1),attack(x,y)(v1) =

1− 2v1 0 ≤ v1 ≤ y1− y y < v1 ≤ 1,
u2(1,1),truth(w1) =

1− 2w1 0 ≤ w1 ≤
1
2
0 otherwise,
u1(1,1),truth(v1) = 1.
Define∆(θ1) = u
2
truth(θ1)− u
2
attack(θ1) + u
1
truth(θ1)− u
1
attack(θ1). We have
∆(θ1) =

1− u2attack(θ1) ≥ 0 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ y, θ1 ≤
1
2
6θ1 − 1− y − x ≥ 0
1
2 < θ1 ≤ y
y − u2attack(θ1) + 1− 2θ1 ≥ 0 y < θ1 ≤
1
2
4θ1 − 1− x ≥ 0 y,
1
2 < θ1 ≤
x+y
2
y ≥ 0 x+y2 < θ1,
1
2 < θ1.
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This covers all the non-trivial cases. This yields for q = 12 ,
E
q= 1
2
,F,n=2
θˆ,truth
− E
q= 1
2
,F,n=2
θˆ,attack(x,y)
=
1
2
E[∆(θ1)] ≥ 0.
By Lemma 3,
E[u1truth − u
1
attack(x,y)] ≥ 0.
Hence, for an attack to be beneficial it must hold that
E[u2truth − u
2
attack(x,y)] < 0.
So, the expression
E[(1 − q)(u2attack − u
2
truth) + q(u
1
attack − u
1
truth)]
is monotone increasing in q, and for all q′ > 12 it is non-positive. In addition, it is
straightforward to construct an example that shows a beneficial attack for any q < 12 ,
based on the above expressions. We conclude that q∗n=2,g=1 =
1
2 .
Lemma 5. q∗n=2,g=2 =
2
3 .
The proof is similar to the one given in Lemma 4 and is given in Appendix C.
4 Global Granularity Thresholds for n > 2: q∗n = 1
Based on the result of q∗n=2 =
2
3 for two bidders, we may now ask what are the q
∗
values for different values of n.
Theorem 4.1. For any n > 2, q < 1, there is an attack x, y and distribution F such
that the attack is beneficial.
Proof. We construct F as a discrete distribution for the sake of a more concise argu-
ment. A continuous distribution close enough to F satisfies the same argument.
We examine an attacker of type 1. By Lemma 2 we write θ = 1. We choose
x = 1, y = 12 . We show how we choose ǫ(q, n) later, and we define Fǫ(q,n) with
Pr(0.6) = 1− 2ǫ, Pr(0.5) = Pr(1) = ǫ.
We prove that the attack is beneficial for q < 1, n > 2. Consider the following
possible adversary configurations. First we ignore the possibility that the adversary
value is 0.5 (the probability for this is (1 − ǫ)n˜):
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There exists at least one adversary of type 2 with value 1: the utility for both attack
and truthful bidding is 0.
There exist at least two adversaries of type 1: then y is not in the winning set and
also doesn’t affect the price. Thus, the utility for attack and truthful bidding is the
same.
There exists exactly one adversary of type 1: Note that all other adversaries of type
2 have a value of 0.6. If the type 1 adversary has value 0.6, then attack and truthful
bidding utility are both 0.4. If the type 1 adversary has value 1, then attack utility is 0.5
while truthful utility is 0.8.
No adversaries of type 1: we are left with only type 2 adversaries with value 0.6. In
this case, the truthful utility is 0 and the attack utility is 0.1.
Define δ = (1−q)
n˜
1000 and choose
ǫ(q, n)=min
{ 1− q
3000q
,
1
103
,
1− n˜−1
√
1
10
2
, 1−n−1
√
3
3+(1−q)
n˜
1000
}
,
which satisfies
0.1(1−2ǫ)n˜(1−q)n˜+(0.3)n˜(1−2ǫ)n˜−1ǫ(1−q)n˜−1q > δ, (1)
(1 − ǫ)n˜δ − 3(1− (1− ǫ)n˜) > 0. (2)
Equation 1 implies that the expected utility of the attack, given that there is no
0.5 value adversary, is more than δ. The first summand refers to the fourth case we
described and the second summand to the third case. Equation 1 implies that the overall
expected utility is positive, where the constant 3 in the equation was chosen since an
attack can decrease the utility relative to truthful bidding by at most 3: since the attacker
is a 1-type, truthful bidding yields at most a utility of one, and an attack can lose at most
2.
This puts a positive lower bound on the difference between attack utility and truth-
ful bid utility, and thus the attack is beneficial as defined.
10
5 Beta Distributions Granularity Thresholds: a Com-
puter Algebra Approach
Given the result of the previous section, we know that it is impossible to guarantee
a truthful Bayesian equilibrium for arbitrary distributions when q < 1. Hence, in
this section we instead consider a general family of distributions, namely the Beta
distributions. This family of distributions includes many natural distributions that are
parameterized by two parameters α and β. We consider these parameter values to be
integers. The probability density function of Beta(α, β) is then fα,β(θi) = (α +
β − 1)!
θ
α−1
i
(1−θi)
β−1
(α−1)!(β−1)! . Our aim is to find the corresponding granularity thresholds
q∗
n,F=Beta(α,β).
We address this challenge as follows. We show that the difference between the
expected utility of a 1-type truthful bidder and the expected utility of an attacker is a
polynomial P (in x, y, q). Similarly, we show that the difference between the expected
utility of a 2-type truthful bidder and the expected utility of an attacker is a polynomial
Q (in θ, y, q). The minimal q for which in the domain [0, 1] × [0, 1] × [q, 1] these
polynomials are positive is in fact q∗
n,F=Beta(α,β). This reduces the problem into a
computer algebra problem, given parameters n, α, β which can be solved using state-
of-the-art techniques. Our results show that indeed the desired granularity thresholds
for the tested Beta distributions’ parameter values are spread around 0.5.
A reduction to a polynomials positivity decision problem
Let Iθi(α, β) be the cumulative distribution function of Beta(α, β) at θi. We develop
the Bayesian expectation utility expressions.
E
k,Beta(α,β),n
θˆ,∗
[u] =∫ 1
θ1=0
...
∫ 1
θn=0
n˜∏
t=1
fα,β(θt)u(θ1, ..., θn˜)dθn˜...dθ1 =
∑
1≤i6=j≤k
∑
1≤m≤n˜−k
∫ 1
θ1=0
...
∫ 1
θn˜=0
n˜∏
t=1
fα,β(θt)u˜(θm, θi, θj)
1gm=1,∀p,gp=2→θm≥θp,gi=gj=1,∀p,gp=1→θi≥θj≥θpdθn˜...dθ1 =
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k!
(k − 2)+!
(n˜− k)!
(n˜− k − 1)+!
∫ 1
w1=0
∫ w1
w2=0
...
∫ w1
wn−k=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k∫ 1
v1=0
∫ v1
v2=0
∫ v2
v3=0
...
∫ v2
vk=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
n∏
t=1
fα,β(θt)u˜(w1, v1, v2)dvk...dv1dwn˜−k...dw1 =
k!
(k − 2)+!
(n˜− k)!
(n˜− k − 1)+!
∫ 1
v˜1=0
∫ v˜1
v˜2=0
∫ 1
w˜1=0
fα,β(w˜1)fα,β(v˜1)fα,β(v˜2)Iw˜1(α, β)
(n−k−1)+
Iv˜2(α, β)
(k−1)+ u˜(w˜1, v˜2, v˜1)dw˜1dv˜2dv˜1.
Recall that k!(k−2)+! =

1 k = 0, 1k(k − 1) k = 2, ..., n˜ , (n˜−k)!(n˜−k−1)+! =

1 k = n˜n˜− k k = 0, ..., n˜− 1 .
We then have
Pnα,β(x, y, θ=1, q)=E
q,Beta(α,β),n
(1,1),truth [u˜]−E
q,Beta(α,β),n
(1,1),attack(x,y)[u˜] =
n˜∑
k=0
(
n˜
k
)
qk(1− q)n˜−kP k,nα,β (x, y, θ = 1),
Qnα,β(x=1, y, θ, q)=E
q,Beta(α,β),n
(2,θ),truth [u]−E
q,Beta(α,β),n
(2,θ),attack(1,y)[u] =
n˜∑
k=0
(
n˜
k
)
qk(1− q)n˜−kQk,nα,β(x = 1, y, θ),
with
P k,nα,β (x, y, θ=1)=E
k,Beta(α,β),n
(1,1),truth [u]− E
k,Beta(α,β),n
(1,1),attack(x,y)[u],
Qk,nα,β(x=1, y, θ)=E
k,Beta(α,β),n
(2,θ),truth [u]− E
k,Beta(α,β),n
(2,θ),attack(1,y)[u].
Notice that P k,nα,β and Q
k,n
α,β are polynomial expressions for any α, β, n and 0 ≤
k ≤ n˜. That is since the probability density fα,β(θi) is polynomial in its variable,
and the incomplete beta distribution function Iθi(α, β) is polynomial in its parameter.
Also, the full form of the u˜
θˆ,Bids
(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2) are expressions which are multiples of
polynomials in w˜1, v˜1, v˜2, x, y, θ and indicator functions with bounds polynomial in
these parameters. The expressions are given in full in Appendix D. We can thus rewrite
the triple integral as a linear combination of triple integrals of the following form:
∫ T2(x,y,θ)
v˜1=T1(x,y,θ)
∫ T4(v˜1,x,y,θ)
v˜2=T3(v˜1,x,y,θ)
∫ T6(v˜1,v˜2,x,y,θ)
w˜1=T5(v˜1,v˜2,x,y,θ)
T7(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2, x, y, θ)dw˜1dv˜2dv˜1,
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with all Ti polynomials. Since the class of Polynomials is closed under integration and
composition, we have that all P k,nα,β , Q
k,n
α,β are polynomial in x, y, θ. By the definition
of Pnα,β(x, y, θ = 1, q), Q
n
α,β(x, y, θ = 1, q) as linear combinations of polynomials in
q multiplied by the k-parameterized polynomials, they are also polynomials.
Solving polynomial positivity using computer algebra
The question of whether truthfulness is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is now reduced to
whether there are no assignments (a true type and attack bids) where the polynomial is
negative in the domain. For this purpose, any computer algebra method that is able to
prove polynomial positivity suffices. The method we found most useful for our setting
is Partial Cylindrical Algebraic Decomposition [2]. Given a guess of the threshold
value q∗ guess for a given Beta(α, β) distribution and n value, we feed Maple [3]
with the following problems:
PartialCylindricalAlgebraicDecomposition
(P q,nα,β(x, y, 1), [x− y, y, 1− q, 1− x, q − q
∗ guess],
PolynomialRing([x, y, q]),
PartialCylindricalAlgebraicDecomposition
(Qq,nα,β(1, y, theta), [v − theta, y, 1− q, q − q
∗ guess],
PolynomialRing([theta, y, q]).
Partial CAD finds representing points in the Cylindrical Algebraic Decomposition.
It then suffices to check each of the representing points to be positive for the corre-
sponding polynomial, in order to verify that it does not attain negative values in the
entire domain. The guess q∗ guess is derived either from a bisection of the [0, 1] inter-
val, or from the split attack on which we elaborate in the next section.
Our findings are given in the following figures. As can be seen, the granularity
thresholds in all cases we tested are bound away from 1, in particular, lower than 0.75.
Some of the symbols in the figures (in particular, some of the n’s in the x-axis and
some of the α’s and β’s in the legend) are in bold while others are not. Bold symbols
represent cases that were fully verified by the partial CAD method described above,
and they hold for all possible attacks. In the three-dimensional figure, the fully verified
cases are those marked with x symbol. For these fully verified cases, we observe that
the granularity threshold is typically decreasing (improving) as a function of α and
increasing as a function of β. Interestingly, in all fully verified cases, the attack most
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Figure 1: q* values for beta distribution parameter values
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Figure 2: q* values for beta distributions n=3
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persistent in respect to higher values of q (“best attack”) was the split attack. We
therefore extend the figures to include q∗ values that were evaluated only for the split
attack – these are the non-bold parameter values in the figures.
The Mathematica and Maple files to attain and verify the figures’ exact values in-
dependently can be found at https://github.com/yotam-gafni/vcg bayesian fnp.
6 Split Attacks
As mentioned, all the q∗ values given in the figures of the last section have a shared
property — they are in fact all derived from one attack, which proves itself in all veri-
fied cases to be the one that yields the highest q* values. This attack is the split attack
— where a 2-type attacker with value 1 splits her bid into two 1-type bids x = y = 1.
In this section, we focus our attention on the split attack, which gives us a few advan-
tages. First, the problem formulation for the CAD becomes uni-variable, which allows
us to computationally reach higher parameter values. Also, we are able to prove ana-
lytic results for general n values. We establish a few lemmas that yield such a general
result for the uniform distribution case.
Lemma 6. For the uniform distribution, Qk,n1,1 (1, 1, 1) is monotone increasing as a
series in k.
Proof. By direct calculation we have
F (n˜, k) = Qk,n1,1 (1, 1, 1) =

1
(n˜+1)2n˜−1 −
2
n˜+1 k = 0
8
n˜(n˜+1) −
2
n˜
− 3
n˜(n˜+1)2n˜−1 k = 1
1
n˜+1 k = n˜
2k
2n˜−k
∑n˜−k
i=0
(
n˜−k
i
)
( 1
i+k +
1
i+k+1 )+
2k(k−1)(n˜−k)
(n˜+1)(n˜−k+1)2n˜−k+1
∑n˜−k+1
i=0
(
n˜−k+1
i
)
1
n˜−i−
2
n˜
− 4k(n˜−k)(n˜−k+1)2n˜−k+1
∑n˜−k+1
i=0
(
n˜−k+1
i
)
1
i+k−
k(k−1)
(n˜+1)2n˜−k
∑n˜−k
i=0
(
n˜−k
i
)
( 1
n˜−i +
1
n˜−i−1 ) o/w.
We show that for any n˜ ≥ 2, 0 ≤ k ≤ n˜− 1,
F (n˜, k) < F (n˜, k + 1).
It can be directly verified that F (n˜, 0) < F (n˜, 1) < F (n˜, 2) for every n˜ ≥ 2, and
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also that for n˜ = 2 the series is monotone. For the n˜ ≥ 3, 2 ≤ k ≤ n˜− 1 case, we can
define
G[n˜, k] = F [n˜, k + 1]− F [n˜, k],
for which the following recurrences hold:
(2n˜− 2k)G[n˜, k] + (−4 + k − 3n˜)G[1 + n˜, k] + (3 + n˜)G[2 + n˜, k] = 0, (3)
(2 + n˜)G[1 + n˜, n˜] = 2n˜G[n˜, n˜− 1], (4)
(n˜2 + 4n˜+ 3)G[n˜+ 2, n˜] = (2n˜2 + 4n˜)G[n˜+ 1, n˜− 1]. (5)
Recurrence 3 is especially tricky to obtain and its proof is given in Appendix E.
We now show that ∀n˜ ≥ 3, 2 ≤ k ≤ n˜ − 1, G[n˜, k] > 0. For that, we denote
m = n˜− k. It’s enough to show that for anym ≥ 1, k ≥ 2,
G[k +m+ 1, k] > G[k +m, k] > 0.
We prove by induction on m. First we show the induction step. Assume for some m
the assumption holds. Then by the recurrence relation (3)
G[k +m+ 2, k] =
(3m+ 2k + 4) ·G[k +m+ 1, k]− 2m ·G[k +m, k]
3 + k +m
>
(m+ 2k + 4) ·G[k +m+ 1, k]
3 + k +m
≥ G[k +m+ 1, k] ≥ 0.
As for the base case G[n˜+ 1, n˜− 1] > G[n˜, n˜− 1] > 0, we prove by induction on
n˜. For n˜ = 3 it holds. Now assume for some n˜ the induction assumption holds, then
G[n˜+ 2, n˜] =
2n˜2 + 4n˜
(n˜2 + 4n˜+ 3)
G[n˜+ 1, n˜− 1] >
2n˜2 + 4n˜
(n˜2+4n˜+3)
G[n˜, n˜−1] =
(2 + n˜)(2n˜2 + 4n˜)
2n˜(n˜2 + 4n˜+ 3)
G[n˜+ 1, n˜] >
G[n˜+ 1, n˜] =
2n˜
2 + n˜
G[n˜, n˜− 1] > 0
holds by (5), induction assumption, (4), arithmetics, (4) and induction assumption
respectively.
The recurrences in equations 3 to 5 were found using RISCErgoSum’s Guess pack-
age [6].
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Lemma 7. Recall that
Qk,nα,β(1, 1, 1) = E
k,Beta(α,β),n
(2,1),truth [u]− E
k,Beta(α,β),n
(2,1),attack(1,1)[u],
and regard it as a series of real numbers parameterized by k. If the series is monotone
increasing in k, then if there exists q such that Qnα,β(1, 1, 1, q) = 0, it follows that
q∗n,g=2,θ=1,x=1,y=1,F=Uni([0,1]) = q.
Proof. It suffices to prove that ∀q′ < q,Qnα,β(1, 1, 1, q
′) < 0 and ∀q′ > q,Qnα,β(1, 1, 1, q
′) >
0. This is due to first order stochastic dominance of a binomial distribution with
a higher q parameter over another binomial distribution with a lower q parameter
[10].
Theorem 6.1. For the uniform distribution, and any number of bidders n ≥ 3,
q∗n,g=2,θ=1,x=1,y=1,F=UNI([0,1]) =
1
2
.
Proof. We examine the expressionsF (n˜, k) derived before and notice that when q = 12
the sum
S[n˜] =
n˜−1∑
k=2
(
n˜
k
)
qk(1− q)n˜−kF (n˜, k)
satisfies the recurrence
−2(1 + n˜)S[n˜] + (2 + n˜)S[1 + n˜] = −7 + 32(1− n˜) + 2n˜, (6)
.
We solve the recurrence and check initial n˜ values. We then see that indeed
S[n˜] = −
F (n˜, 0) + n˜F (n˜, 1) + F (n˜, n˜)
2n˜
,
which means ∀n ≥ 3,
Qnα,β(1, 1, 1,
1
2
) =
1
2n˜
n˜∑
k=0
(
n˜
k
)
F (n˜, k) =
S[n˜] +
F (n˜, 0) + n˜F (n˜, 1) + F (n˜, n˜)
2n˜
= 0.
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By Lemma 7 and Lemma 6 this proves that
∀n ≥ 3, q∗n,g=2,θ=1,x=1,y=1,F=UNI([0,1]) =
1
2
.
We used RISCErgoSum’s HolonomicFunctionsMathematica package to derive and
solve the recurrence in equation 6 [7].
7 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this work, we investigate the most simple yet general model for a Bayesian analysis
of VCG under Sybil attacks. Interestingly, our results imply false-name resistance
can be obtained without sacrificing social welfare in many cases, which we capture
using the notion of granularity threshold. While we were able to show that the split
attack is in a sense the best false-name bid attack in our study, an interesting open
question is under what conditions does the split attack yield the highest q∗ values. Can
a formula be derived for the asymptotic behavior of q∗ as a function of α, β for the beta
distributions, or for specific n values? Can we find larger classes of distributions that
admit a nice analysis? Can we exploit approximations of other general distributions
by Beta (or more generally polynomial) distributions to yield precise bounds for their
respective q∗ values?
In section 3 we restrict attention to the case F := F1 = F2, i.e., the same per-
item value distribution for different item demand types, which allows for an elegant
analysis. If they are bound together by a looser correlation or stochastic dominance
criterion, a result in the same spirit might still be attainable, even though its not clear
in what form.
It is possible given the computer algebra methods for the beta distribution to dis-
cuss a larger number of items. In the two item case we were able to prove Lemma 1
that shows a bidder has two alternatives - to submit a truthful bid or submit a pair
(1, x), (1, y) with 0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 1. This results in a tri-variate polynomial with q,x,y.
With more items (e.g., 3) one might consider other scenarios: The bidder submits (3,x),
or (2, x), (1, y), etc - but still a small finite space that depends on the number of items.
For each case one derives a polynomial as done in section 5, and using the computer
algebra solvers can come up with analytic results. Though computationally more de-
manding, in theory this could extend to any number of items. Notice that in the two
item case, there is a single number q that measures granularity by quantifying the prob-
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ability of a 1-item demand bidder to appear. Once we analyze 3 items or more, one
needs choose a finer way of defining granularity - for example, we could say that hav-
ing the probability vector (0.4,0.5,0.1) over the amounts (1,2,3) of item demand is more
granular than (0.4,0.1,0.5), even though the q value as defined for both is 0.4.
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A Technical Assumptions for Analysis
The following section constitutes a proof for Lemma 2 in Section 2:
Lemma 2. To prove that a truthful BNE exists under some settings, it suffices to analyze
1-type attackers that have θ = 1 ≥ x, y, and 2-type attackers that have x = 1 ≥ θ, y.
We begin with two auxiliary lemmas. We then prove the claim regarding 1-type
attackers in Lemma 10, and the claim regarding 2-type attackers using the combination
of Lemma 11 and Lemma 12.
Lemma 8. The VCG outcome is homogeneous under multiplication of bids and values,
i.e., if we multiply all bids and values by a constantα, the winning set remains the same,
and payments and utilities are multiplied by α as well.
Proof. Assume we have a bid set (g1, θ1), ..., (gn, θn). We show w.l.o.g. that
u((g1, αθ1), ..., (gn, αθn)) = αu((g1, θ1), ..., (gn, θn))
. First, we notice that the winning set in both cases have the same indices. The price
is also determined by the same non-winning set indices. Both the profit and the price
are multiplied by α, and so as the value is multiplied by α, the overall utility is also
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multiplied by α and we have homogeneity. Notice that this can easily be extended to
apply in the case of expected utilities.
We use Lemma 8 throughout to assume that if we have a bound M for the bid
and true type values for both attacker and her adversaries, then we can set M = 1
(“normalize”). ‘
Lemma 9. For an attack x, y, for any adversary set with v˜1 > x or w˜1 > x an attack
is not beneficial for any true type. Therefore, if there exists such a distribution F that
an attack is beneficial for some true type θ, there must exist a distribution F ′ with a
beneficial attack for θ such that suppF ′ ⊆ [0,max(x, θ)].
Proof. If v˜1 > x, then y never enters the winning set, and so by VCG truthfulness for
single bids, the attack cannot be beneficial. If w˜2 > x ≥ y and following the first
part of the proof, we can also assume v˜1 ≤ x; then the attack utility is 0 and Since
truthfulness in VCG is individually rational, the attack is not beneficial. This holds
whether the true type has g = 1 or g = 2.
Now we conclude that if under a distribution F for adversary per-item valuation
an attack is beneficial, then F (max(x, θ)) ≥ F (x) > 0. Define the pdf f ′(ψ) =

f(ψ)
F (max(x,θ) 0 ≤ ψ ≤ max(x, θ)
0 ψ > max(x, θ)
and its corresponding cdf F ′, they then satisfy the
statement of the lemma.
Lemma 10. (1-type). If there exists a true type (1, θ) that has a beneficial attack, then
there also exists a true type (1, θ′) that has a beneficial attack x, y and y ≤ x ≤ θ′.
Proof. Let a bidder with true type (1, θ) attack with x, y such that θ < x. We show that
the same attack is beneficial for the true type (1, x), for any adversary setup θˆ1, ..., θˆn˜.
Define
∆(θˆ1, ..., θˆn˜) = ((u˜(1,x),attack(x,y) − u˜(1,x),truth)
− (u˜(1,θ),attack(x,y) − u˜(1,θ),truth))(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2).
We now have
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∆(θˆ1, ..., θˆn˜) =

0 θ ≥ v˜2, θ +max(v˜1, y) ≥ w˜1
v˜2 − θ ≥ 0 x ≥ v˜2, x+ v˜1 ≥ w˜1, v˜1 + v˜2≥ w˜1, (θ < v˜2||θ + v˜1 ≥ w˜1)
2w˜1 − θ − v˜1 ≥ 0 x ≥ v˜2, x+ v˜1 ≥ w˜1, v˜1 + v˜2< w˜1, (θ < v˜2||θ + v˜1 ≥ w˜1)
x− θ ≥ 0 x ≥ y ≥ v˜1, x+ y ≥ w˜1 > x+ v˜1
0 otherwise.
Now Since θ ≥ x ≥ y, by Lemma 9 we can also assume suppF ⊆ [0, θ]. We then
use Lemma 8 to normalize θ to 1.
Lemma 11. (2-type). Assume a 2-type attacker with θ > x > y. Then, the attacker is
better off setting y = x.
Proof. Examine an arbitrary set of adversaries. If it includes 1-type such that y <
v1 < x, then, the change is better. For any 2-type adversary, if the top one satisfies
y
2 ≤ w ≤
x
2 , then the change reduces payment. If
y+x
2 ≤ w ≤ x, then it would move
from utility 0 to utility 2v − 2w ≥ 2v − 2x > 0. Otherwise no change.
Lemma 12. (2-type). Assume a 2-type attacker with θ > x = y. Then, the attacker is
better off setting x = y = θ.
Proof. Simple and similar.
Now Since by Lemma 9we can also assume suppF ⊆ [0, x]. We then use Lemma 8
to normalize x to 1.
B q = 1 induces Bayesian Resilience
The following section constitutes a proof for Lemma 3 in Section 2.
Lemma 3. When all adversaries are 1-type an attack is never beneficial. Thus, q = 1
always induces a truthful BNE.
Proof. By Lemma 2 we can always assume a 1-type valuation θ is 1. Then define
∆ = Eq=1,F,n(1,1),truth[u]− E
q=1,F,n
(1,1),attack(x,y)[u] =
Ek=n˜,F,n(1,1),truth[u]− E
k=n˜,F,n
(1,1),attack(x,y)[u] = E(∆˜(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2)),
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with
∆˜(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2)= (u˜(1,1),truth − u˜(1,1),attack(x,y)(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2).
It thus suffices to show ∆˜ ≥ 0 to attain ∆ ≥ 0:
∆˜ =


1− v˜2 ≥ 0 x < v˜2
0 x ≥ v˜2 ≥ y
y − v˜2 > 0 x, v˜1 ≥ y > v˜2
2v˜1 − v˜2 ≥ 0 x ≥ y > v˜1.
Following a similar argument for a 2-type attacker, by Lemma 2 we can always assume
a 2-type attack with x = 1. Then define
∆ = Eq=1,F,n(2,θ),truth − E
q=1,F,n
(2,θ),attack(1,y) = E
k=n˜,F,n
(2,θ),truth − E
k=n˜,F,n
(2,θ),attack(1,y).
We can only consider the cases where the two attack bids are in the winning set; other-
wise the attacker has negative utility, and the truthful strategy in VCG has non-negative
utility Since VCG is individually rational. We thus only consider y ≥ v˜1. However, in
this case, for any v˜1, v˜2, we have
u˜(2,θ),truth = (2θ − v˜1 − v˜2)1θ≥v˜1 , u˜(2,θ),attack(1,y) = 2θ − 2v˜1.
Then, ∀y ≥ v˜1 ≥ v˜2, u(2,θ),truth ≥ u(2,θ),attack(1,y). So we also have by total expec-
tation that ∆ ≥ 0. Note that it is actually redundant to prove truthful bidding for the
2-type attacker, Since given q = 1 it is not in the support of the distribution to ever
have a 2-type attacker.
C Proof of Lemma 5
The following section constitutes a proof for Lemma 5 in Section 3.
Lemma 5. q∗n=2,g=2 =
2
3 .
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Proof. For 2-types we may assume y, θ ≤ x = 1.
u2attack(w1) =


2θ 0 ≤ w1 ≤
y
2
2θ − 2w1 + y
y
2 < w1 ≤
1
2
2θ − 4w1 + y + 1
1
2 < w1 ≤
1+y
2
0 otherwise,
u1attack(v1) =

2θ − 2v1 0 ≤ v1 ≤ y−y y < v1 ≤ 1,
u2truth(w1) =

2θ − 2w1 0 ≤ w1 ≤ θ0 otherwise,
u1truth(v1) =

2θ − v1 0 ≤ v1 ≤ 2θ0 otherwise.
If we then define∆(θ1) = u
2
truth(θ1)−u
2
attack(θ1)+2(u
1
truth(θ1)−u
1
attack(θ1)),
we get
∆(θ1) =

6θ − 4θ1 − u2attack(θ1)− 2u
1
attack(θ1) ≥ 0 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ θ
2y − u2attack(θ1) ≥ 2θ1 + y − 2θ ≥ 0 y ≤ θ < θ1 ≤
1
2
2y − u2attack(θ1) ≥ 4θ1 + y − 2θ − 1 ≥
2θ1 + y − 1 ≥ y ≥ 0 y ≤ θ < θ1,
1
2 < θ1 ≤
1+y
2
2θ1 − u1attack(θ1) ≥ 2θ1 − 2θ ≥ 0 θ < θ1 ≤ 2θ, y > θ
2(2θ1 − 2θ)− u
2
attack(θ1) ≥ 4θ1 − 6θ ≥ 0 2θ < θ1 ≤ y
2y − u2attack(θ1) ≥ 2y − 2θ ≥ 0 2θ < θ1, y < θ1,
where all the inequalities are satisfied for the corresponding domains. This covers
all the non-trivial cases, and yields for q = 23 :
E
q= 2
3
,F,n=2
θˆ,truth
− E
q= 2
3
,F,n=2
θˆ,attack(x,y)
=
1
3
E[∆(θ1)] ≥ 0.
By the same argument that concludes Lemma 4, we have q∗n=2,g=2 =
2
3 .
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D Full Description of u˜θˆ,Bids(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2) for n Player Beta
Distribution Analysis
The following section gives the full form of u˜
θˆ,Bids
(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2) that is used in the
reduction to a polynomial positivity decision problem in Section 5. Recall that we
claim there that u˜
θˆ,Bids
is generally of the form of polynomials in w˜1, v˜1, v˜2, x, y, θ
multiplied by an indicator function with bounds which are also polynomial in these
parameters. This is done in a way that allows to establish a general form for the utility
expectation under a Beta distribution. The full form allows us to directly verify this,
and by itself is obtained by direct calculation.
By Lemma 2 we can assume for 1-type bidders that θ = 1. For a 1-type truthful
bidder, we have
u˜(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2) =

1− v˜2 0 ≤ v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ w˜1 ≤
v˜1+v˜2
2
1− 2w˜1 + v˜1 0 ≤ v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ 1,
v˜1+v˜2
2 < w˜1 ≤
v˜1+1
2
0 otherwise.
For a 1-type bidder attack, we have
u˜(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2) =

1− 2v˜1 0 ≤ v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ y, 0 ≤ w˜1 ≤
y+v˜1
2
1− 2w˜1 + y − v˜1 0 ≤ v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ y,
y+v˜1
2 < w˜1 ≤
x+v˜1
2
1− 4w˜1 + y + 1 0 ≤ v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ y,
x+v˜1
2 < w˜1 ≤
x+y
2
1− y y < v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ w˜1 ≤
y+v˜1
2
1− v˜2 y < v˜2 ≤ x, v˜1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ w˜1 ≤
v˜1+v˜2
2
1− 2w˜1 + v˜1 y < v˜2 ≤ x, v˜1 ≤ 1,
v˜1+max(v˜2,y)
2 < w˜1 ≤
v˜1+x
2
0 otherwise.
By Lemma 2 we can assume for 2-type bidders that x = 1. For a 2-type truthful
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bidder, we have
u˜(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2) =

2θ − v˜1 − v˜2 0 ≤ v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ min(1, 2θ), v˜1 + v˜2 ≤ 2θ, 0 ≤ w˜1 ≤
v˜1+v˜2
2
2θ − 2w˜1 0 ≤ v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ min(1, 2θ), v˜1 + v˜2 ≤ 2θ,
v˜1+v˜2
2 < w˜1 ≤ θ
0 otherwise.
For a 2-type bidder attack, we have
u˜(w˜1, v˜1, v˜2) =

2θ − 2v˜1 0 ≤ v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ y, 0 ≤ w˜1 ≤
y+v˜1
2
2θ − 2w˜1 + y − v˜1 0 ≤ v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ y,
y+v˜1
2 < w˜1 ≤
1+v˜1
2
2θ − 4w˜1 + y + 1 0 ≤ v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ y,
1+v˜1
2 < w˜1 ≤
1+y
2
−y 0 ≤ v˜2 ≤ y < v˜1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ w˜1 ≤
y+v˜1
2
−v˜2 y < v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ w˜1 ≤
v˜1+v˜2
2
−2w˜1 + v˜1 y < v˜2 ≤ v˜1 ≤ 1,
v˜1+max(v˜2,y)
2 < w˜1 ≤
v˜1+1
2
0 otherwise.
E Proof of recurrence 3
Recurrences are presented in proofs of Lemma 6 and Theorem 6.1, numbered as equa-
tions 3-6. Recurrence 4 and 5 can be verified directly using straightforward arithmetic.
Recurrence 6 was derived and solved using Christoph Koutschan’s HolonomicFunc-
tions Mathematica package. As for recurrence 3, we provide a full description of its
proof here.
Lemma 13. Let G[n˜, k] as defined in the proof of Lemma 6, it then holds that
(2n˜− 2k)G[n˜, k] + (−4 + k − 3n˜)G[1 + n˜, k] + (3 + n˜)G[2 + n˜, k] = 0,
.
Proof. Throughout the proof we use the notation 2F1[a, b; c; z] to denote Gauss Hy-
perGeometric function. From its definition it is possible to extract the following full
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form forG[n˜, k]:
G[n˜, k] = −
1
n(1 + n)(1 − k + n)
(2n+1n(1 + n)−
2k+1n(1 + n)2F1[k,−1 + k − n; 1 + k;−1]+
2k(k − 1)k2F1[−1 + k − n,−n; 1− n;−1])+
1
n(n+ 1)(n− k)
(2n+1n(n+ 1)−
2k+2n(n+ 1)2F1[k + 1, k − n; k + 2;−1]+
2k+1(k + 1)2F1[k − n,−n; 1− n;−1]).
We seperate it into three parts:
G1[n˜, k] = −
2k(k − 1)k2F1[−1 + k − n,−n; 1− n;−1]
n(1 + n)(1− k + n)
+
2k+1(k + 1)2F1[k − n,−n; 1− n;−1]
n(n+ 1)(n− k)
,
(G1)
G2[n˜, k] =
2k+12F1[k,−1 + k − n; 1 + k;−1]
1− k + n
−
2k+22F1[k + 1, k − n; k + 2;−1]
n− k
,
(G2)
G3[n˜, k] = −
2n+1
1− k + n
+
2n+1
n− k
. (G3)
It holds that
(2n˜− 2k)G1[n˜, k] + (−4 + k − 3n˜)G1[1 + n˜, k]+
(3 + n˜)G1[2 + n˜, k] =
−2n+4k
(1 − k + n)(2− k + n)(3− k + n)
,
(7)
(2n˜− 2k)G2[n˜, k] + (−4 + k − 3n˜)G2[1 + n˜, k]+
(3 + n˜)G2[2 + n˜, k] =
2n+5k
(1 − k + n)(2− k + n)(3− k + n)
,
(8)
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(2n˜− 2k)G3[n˜, k] + (−4 + k − 3n˜)G3[1 + n˜, k]+
(3 + n˜)G3[2 + n˜, k] =
−
2n+4k
(1− k + n)(2 − k + n)(3− k + n)
.
(9)
Together they sum up to 0, which concludes the lemma statement.
The third part recurrence can be directly calculated.
Equation 7 can be attained by applying the following transformations. First apply-
ing E1, C1, E2, C2 to G1[n˜, k], and then C3− 7 to the recurrence expression. All the
equations hold due to Euler transform and the contiguous equations for hypergeometric
functions.
2F1[−1 + k − n,−n; 1− n;−1] = 22+n−k2F1[2− k, 1; 1− n;−1], (E1)
2F1[2− k, 1; 1− n;−1] = 2F1[1, 2− k; 1− n;−1], (C1)
2F1(k − n,−n; 1− n;−1) = 21−k+n2F1(1− k, 1; 1− n;−1), (E2)
2F1(1− k, 1; 1− n;−1) = 2F1(1, 1− k; 1− n;−1). (C2)
2n(n+ 1)2F1[1, 1− k;−1− n;−1] =
(n+ 1)(k − 1− n)2F1[1, 1− k; 1− n;−1]+
(2n(n+ 1) + n(2− k + n)2F1[1, 1− k;−n;−1],
(C3)
− 2n2F1[1, 1− k;−n;−1] = −n+ (−n− 1 + k)2F1[1, 1− k; 1− n;−1], (C4)
2n(n+ 1)2F1[1, 2− k;−1− n;−1] =
(n+ 1)(k − 2− n)2F1[1, 2− k; 1− n;−1]+
2n(n+ 1) + n(3− k + n)2F1[1, 2− k;−n;−1],
(C5)
− 2n2F1[1, 2− k;−n;−1] =
− n+ (−n− 2 + k)2F1[1, 2− k; 1− n;−1],
(C6)
(n− k + 1)2F1[1, 1− k; 1− n;−1] =
n+ 2(1− k)2F1[1, 2− k; 1− n;−1].
(C7)
Equation 8 can be attained by applying the following transformations. First ap-
plying E3, E4 to G1[n˜, k], and then C8 − 12 to the recurrence expression. All the
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equations hold due to Euler transform and the contiguous equations for hypergeomet-
ric functions.
2F1[k,−1 + k − n; 1 + k;−1] = 2(2 + n− k)2F1[1, 2 + n; 1 + k;−1], (E3)
2F1[k + 1, k − n; 2 + k;−1] = 2(1 + n− k)2F1[1, 2 + n; 2 + k;−1], (E4)
(k − n− 2)2F1[1, 2 + n; 1 + k;−1] =
2(n+ 3)2F1[1, n+ 4; 1 + k;−1]−
(3n+ 7− k)2F1[1, n+ 3; 1 + k;−1],
(C8)
(−3 + k − n)2F1[1, 3 + n; 1 + k;−1] =
k − 2(3 + n)2F1[1, 4 + n; 1 + k;−1],
(C9)
(k − n− 1)2F1[1, 2 + n; 2 + k;−1] =
2(n+ 3)2F1[1, n+ 4; 2 + k;−1]−
(3n+ 6− k)2F1[1, n+ 3; 2 + k;−1],
(C10)
(−2 + k − n)2F1[1, 3 + n; 2 + k;−1] =
(k + 1)− 2(3 + n)2F1[1, 4 + n; 2 + k;−1],
(C11)
(2k + 2)2F1[1, 4 + n; 1 + k;−1] =
(k + 1) + (−3 + k − n)2F1[1, 4 + n; 2 + k;−1].
(C12)
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